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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, operators, suppliers and lessors in the min-
eral industry have experienced severe financial difficulties result-
ing from the low prices received for produced oil, natural gas
and coal. Reduced revenues have caused working interest owners
to experience increasing difficulties in meeting obligations for
supplies, wages, taxes, royalties or other rentals, and payment
of other expenses incident to the mineral business. These in-
creased financial difficulties have re-awakened creditors' interest
in remedies available for nonpayment-specifically statutory liens
provided under state law to secure payment of debts.2
The applicability of each of the various statutory liens, how-
ever, frequently depends on the characterization of the item upon
which the lien is placed. In the mineral industry, this character-
ization becomes very complex, given the chameleon-like nature
of minerals. In many states the characterization changes from
realty to personalty upon extraction. A lien which would easily
apply to the minerals in place classified as realty may no longer
be available once those minerals are extracted from the ground
and become personalty. The availability of any given lien is
further complicated by the sale of the mineral after extraction
since many liens do not extend to include proceeds received from
the sale of the attached property.
The purpose of this article is to survey the many liens ap-
' Since their peak in the mid-1970's, prices for oil, natural gas and coal have
been in steady decline, reaching the February, 1986 low levels of approximately $10-
$15/barrel for crude oil, (See More Oil Companies Paying Less For Crude, Lexington
Herald-Leader, Feb. 25, 1986, at C6, col.l); $35/ton for coal (See Marx, Oil Price
Effects Likely To Trickle Into State, Lexington Herald-Leader, Feb. 2, 1986, at A14,
col. I), and $5.738/MCF (or $5.591/MCF if over 200 MCF's are purchased) for natural
gas (Telephone interview with Robert Calin, Marketing Division, Columbia Gas of Kentucky
(Feb. 7, 1986)).
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 376.140-150 (1972) [hereinafter KRSJ (granting lien
to person performing labor or furnishing materials to mineral leaseholds); KRS § 381.460
(1972) (allowing lien for persons making improvements on land); KRS § 383.070(l)
(1972) (lien for rent granted to landlords).
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plicable to the mineral industry and examine in detail those liens
which are applicable to produced minerals and the proceeds of
such minerals once sold. Part I delineates the various liens which
apply to mineral operations in Kentucky. Part 2 examines whether
mechanics and materialmen liens under Kentucky statutory law
3
apply to oil runs or gas runs, or the proceeds therefrom. Finally,
Part 3 canvasses how other state statutes treat these liens, re-
cognizing that the potentially unique provisions of each statute
must be considered when addressing similar problems across
state lines.
I. LIENS APPLICABLE TO THE MINERAL INDUSTRY
In the mineral industry as in other areas of commerce, liens
can be used by creditors to tie up or encumber the real and
personal property of owners and operators. As a result, they
can be very valuable tools for suppliers and very troublesome
encumbrances to operators against whose property the liens are
placed. Liens applicable to the mineral industry include the
following, albeit not exhaustive, categories.
A. Contractual Liens
Liens may be created by the parties through specific con-
tractural provisions under various bodies of law. Providers of
services to either landowners or lessees equipping wells and mines
can secure their advances with contractual agreements known
and recognized as mortgages against real property4 and as se-
curity agreements against personal property.5 The specific prop-
erty covered by such mortgages or security agreements is subject
only to the draftsman's craft. Furthermore, the liens are per-
fected and become binding on the parties upon proper filing
without notice.6 Nevertheless, problems frequently arise in de-
KRS § 376.010 (Supp. 1984). A mechanic's or materialman's lien generally
allows redress to persons who have performed labor or have furnished materials for the
construction or alteration of a structure on real property or for other improvements
thereon if such labor or materials were provided at the request of the owner or his
agent.
4 These mortgages are regulated as to form and recordation in KRS Ch. 382 (1972
and Supp. 1984).
1 Security agreements are regulated as to form and priority by the U.C.C., Article
9 (1978).
1 See. e.g., KRS § 382.270 (1972); KRS § 355.9-312(5) (Supp. 1984).
19861
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY [VOL. 2:131
termining whether property "affixed" to the ground is subject
to the lien of a mortgage because it is "real property" or whether
it is subject to Article 9 security agreement requirements as a
"trade fixture."
7
B. Common Law Liens
The simplest form of lien arises out of the right to retain
possession of the property of another until a debt is paid. In
this sense, a pledge of indebtedness is a form of lien and can
be enforced under common law lien theories. One example of a
possessory lien in proceeds is when an operator withholds a
share of the proceeds from a working interest owner until that
owner pays a share of the costs.
Whether or not a common law lien can be asserted, however,
depends entirely on actual physical possession of the property.
In Central Contractor's Service, Inc. v. Ohio County Stone
Company,8 the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied common law
lien relief, stating that the lien required possession of the prop-
erty, and that without such possession the appellant could not
enforce his claim.9 Any right to property based upon common
law lien concepts ends with the claimant's surrender of posses-
sion. '0
C. Equitable Lien
Equitable liens generally arise either from a written contract
in which the parties show an intent to charge a particular prop-
See Ratliff v. Utilities Elkhorn Coal Co., 186 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1945) (shops,
buildings, tenant houses, store buildings, and store houses erected in connection with a
coal mine were found to be personal property capable of removal by lessee); Baine v.
Graber, 112 S.W,2d 66 (Ky. 1938) (underground pipes and well casings held to be
personal property); Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204,
205 (Ky. 1934) (natural gas, being "wild and migratory in nature", is not subject to
being owned until it is captured, at which time it becomes the personal property of the
one extracting it); Patton v. Woodrow, 248 S.W. 226 (Ky. 1923); American Pulverizer
Co. v. Cantrell, 694 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. App. 1985) (case remanded to trial court to
determine as a matter of fact the degree to which the machinery had become attached
to the real property in order to decide whether the machinery was personal property or
a fixture).
255 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1952).
Id. at 21; see also note 137 and accompanying text.
,o See also McFerran v. Louisville Title Co.'s Receiver, 71 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Ky.
1934) (held that since the claimant had surrendered possession of the cash deposits in
dispute, he was no longer entitled to a common law lien on the deposits).
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erty with a debt, or are implied or enforced by a court of equity
if the court feels such application is warranted. These liens have
been enforced by Kentucky courts when, under the circumstan-
ces, fair dealing and good conscience warrant the declaration of
a lien in order to protect one of the parties."
Although an equitable lien was discussed in the Central
Contractor's Service strip mining case,' 2 the court found it was
not applicable since such a lien was enforceable "only in special
cases where the party asserting it shows some superior right."' 3
Since the claimant had not properly filed a lien statement when
it had supplied tractors to the mining company, the court con-
cluded that the claimant failed to show a "superior" right to
the property and was therefore not entitled to an equitable lien
on it.' 4
D. General Mechanic's Liens
Many state statutes provide priority to claims asserted by
mechanics and materialmen who have furnished work or mate-
rials for construction or improvements on property. The lien,
which secures payment of the price or value of the work per-
formed or materials furnished in erecting or repairing a struc-
ture, attaches to the land as well as to the buildings and
improvements.'" If the lien claimant has done work or supplied
" See Back v. Back's Adm'r, 135 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1940). The court explained the
concept by stating:
We have frequently written that in addition to the establishment of a lien
by a written contract which shows an intention to charge some particular
property with a debt or an obligation, there is a thoroughly well-established
principle which, if the facts warranting it exist, creates a charge known as
an equitable lien. This is where a court of equity out of a general consid-
eration of right and justice as applied to the relations of the parties, and
the circumstances of their dealings in the particular case, creates a situation
which in good conscience warrants the declaration of a lien.
Id. at 914; see also Owensboro Banking Co. v. Lewis, 106 S.W.2d 1000, 1004 (Ky.
1937).
.2 See Central Contractor's Service, Inc. v. Ohio County Stone Co., 255 S.W.2d
17 (Ky. 1952).
" Id. at 21.
SId. For further discussion of equitable lien application, see McFerran, 71 S.W.2d
at 657., See In re Louisville Daily News & Enquirer, 20 F.Supp. 465, 466 (W.D. Ky.
1937). The lien dates from the commencement of work upon the improvements and
attaches to the contracting owner's interest in the land. See KRS § 376.010-.130 (1972
and Supp. 1984).
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materials by contract with a lessee of mineral property for a
term of years, the claimant may remove such additions or iin-
provements if he can do so without material injury to previous
improvements. 6 In Kentucky, subcontractors and laborers are
protected by liens, but only for amounts that do not exceed the
aggregate total of the original contract price agreed upon be-
tween the owner and the original contractor. 
7
Although general mechanic's liens are applicable to mineral
operations, the particular state statute must be examined to
determine whether the individuals claiming the lien have per-
formed a type of work protected by the statute. In addition, the
work must be performed "by contract with, or by the written
consent of the owner, contractor, subcontractor, architect or
authorized agent of the owner."' 8
It should be noted that shorter deadlines and different filing
requirements apply to liens asserted against projects owned by
state or local governments such as mining operations conducted
on state university properties. 9 Public project lien statutes must
also be carefully scrutinized since these liens attach not to the
property, but to funds due.20 Filing deadlines, however, are not
always rigidly enforced. If the mechanic's or materialman's lien
claimant has failed to file a statement or lien within the statutory
deadlines, the filing period may be extended if the claimant has
in good faith supplied additional materials such as replacement
parts or repairs necessary to complete the original contract. 2'
E. Specific Mechanic's Lien for Mineral Development
In addition to the general mechanic's lien, which requires an
agreement between the owner (or his agent) and the original
contractor, Kentucky provides a lien for a person furnishing
work, supplies, machinery or other things of value to the lessee
See KRS § 376.040 (1972).
See generally KRS Ch. 376 (1972). The procedures for enforcement of the general
liens are beyond the scope of this article, but a good discussion can be found in Coleman
& Peltier, Mechanics' Liens, 68 Ky. L.J. 681 (1980).
' KRS § 376.010(l) (Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
See KRS §§ 376.210-.260 (1972 and Supp. 1984).
KRS § 376.210 (1972).
21 See, e.g., Sandusky Foundary & Machine Co. v. Wickliffe, 483 F.2d 695 (6th
Cir. 1973); City of Ashland v. Ben Williamson & Co., 171 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1943); Akers
& Co. v. Weil, 65 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1933).
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of an oil, gas or other mineral property.2 2 The lien is applicable
to secure payment from a lessee's entire interest. 23 This lien,
which extends under the wording of "other minerals" to the
coal industry as well as the oil and gas industry,24 must be
perfected and enforced in the same manner as the general me-
chanic's and materialman's liens."
F. Lien for Licensed Engineers and Land Surveyors
Licensed engineers and land surveyors are given a lien
26
similar to a mechanic's lien but the lien is available only if the
claimant has contracted directly with the owner or with the agent
of the owner of the property. 2 The lien applies to "the building,
structure, land or project on which such services were per-
formed." 28 Priority of the lien in Kentucky, as in most states,
is governed by statute, 29 and claimants must generally file a
statement, with the county clerk of the county where the prop-
erty is located, within six (6) months" of commencement of the
work and file suit to enforce the lien within twelve (12) months
from the date of filing.3' Engineers or surveyors who perform
services for public improvement projects in Kentucky must per-
fect liens allowable by this section of the statute by complying
with Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) sections 376.210 to 376.260.
These sections provide for shorter deadlines and different filing
requirements than a mechanic's lien."
22 KRS § 376.140 (1972).
I2 d.; see also Continental Supply Co. v. Sandy River Oil Co.'s Receiver, 291
S.W. 49, 52 (Ky. 1927), where the court discussed the predecessor to the current act,
stating:
This act extends to those who perform labor or furnish material and
supplies in the development of oil leases a lien on the leasehold to secure
the payment for such labor, material, and supplies. This lien is exactly like
the ordinary mechanic liens provided for by sections 2463 et seq. of the
Statutes. Indeed, the 1924 act is a literal copy with the changes necessary
to make it applicable to oil leaseholds of the mechanic's lien statute.
24 See Central Contractors, 255 S.W.2d at 19 (the court allowed such a lien to
apply to a coal mining operation).
KRS § 376.140(3) (1972); see also supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
2 KRS § 376.075 (Supp. 1984).
- Id. at (3).
- Id. at (I).
- See KRS § 376.010(l)-(2) (Supp. 1984).
See KRS § 376.075(4) (Supp. 1984).
Id. at (5).
12 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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G. Employee's Lien
This special lien is available to employees of "any mine...
or of any ... other manufacturing establishment, or of any
other business, whether incorporated or not."" Although the
lien might at first appear to have general application, it actually
applies only in very narrow circumstances: upon the failure,
insolvency or bankruptcy of the employer. 34 When such circum-
stances exist, the lien attaches to the property35 of the employer,
but does not attach to the mine itself if the employer is an
independent contractor and is not the agent of the owner.
36
The function of the employee's lien statute in present times
appears to be to benefit employees upon the employer's bank-
ruptcy or reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code3 and to
provide to employees of the debtor in bankruptcy proceedings
priority rights over secured creditors."' While this priority has
been recognized by courts of bankruptcy,3 9 the continuing valid-
ity of statutory priority for employees of the debtor in bank-
ruptcy over perfected mortgage holders and security interest
holders may be subject to question. The Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that employees of a debtor employer have only a priority
KRS § 376.150 (1972); see also KRS §§ 376.160-.190 (1972).
According to the wording of KRS § 376.150(1) (1972), the lien only applies
"when the property or effects of [the employer] ...are assigned for the benefit of, or
are to be distributed among creditors, whether by operation of law or by its own
act .... The lien was previously used rather frequently in bankruptcy situations, but
it is of questionable value today since the lien's application may have been pre-empted
by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, codified at I1 U.S.C. §§ 507-510 (1984). See also infra
text accompanying note 41.
" KRS § 376.150(1) (1972), specifically allows the lien to apply to both real and
personal property, stating "the property and effects which have been involved in the
business and upon the accessories connected therewith, including any interest in real
property used in carrying on the business." (Emphasis added).
1 See Superior Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Allen, 37 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1931). The court
explained that "the employees of an independent contractor operating a coal mine are
not at the same time employees of the owner of the mine within the meaning and
purpose [of the statute]," and that the employees of the operator were therefore not
entitled to a lien on the property of the owner. Id. at 55.
II U.S.C. §§ 507-510 (1984).
KRS §§ 376.150, .160, .180 (1972), provide that the lien when applicable prevails
over the rights of prior perfected mortgage holders in the property of the employer used
in the business. See Leslie's Adm'x v. Branham, 158 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1942).
" See Freeman Furniture Factories v. Bowlds, 136 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1943); In re
Bennett, 153 F. 673 (6th Cir. 1907).
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claim against assets not subject to the claims of secured credi-
tors.'
H. State and Local Tax Liens
Kentucky's statute creating a lien for unpaid taxes is very
broad, providing that the state, as well as each county, city or
taxing district, have a lien on the property assessed for taxes due
them respectively for five (5) years following the date when the
taxes become delinquent. A lien is also enforceable on any real
property owned by a delinquent taxpayer on the date when the
sheriff offers the tax lien claims for sale as provided in subse-
quent sections. 4' Furthermore, the lien allows for interest, pen-
alties, fees, commissions, charges, and other expenses.
To ensure that the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its local
governmental units could collect taxes due on property assessed,
the legislature granted priority to the tax liens, stating that the
lien "shall have priority over any other obligation or liability
for which the property is liable." 2 KRS section 134.420(2) also
provides that the state (but not counties and cities and other taxing
districts) shall have a "lien of equal rank" with the lien provided
in subsection I of "all property of a taxpayer" (emphasis added)
who owes any of several enumerated taxes or other tax when such
taxes are not included in or covered by the lien provided in subsec-
tion 1. However, the lien on all property arises only from the
time that the assessment becomes delinquetn.4 1 The lien on all
other property is subject to the rights and duties of a holder in
due course and to the rights of "any person taking the property
or lien thereon for value without actual or constructive notice."
44
Such language allows parties who became purchasers or lien holders
of property prior to the time that notice of state tax lien was filed
in an appropriate clerk's office to have priority on all other prop-
erty not covered specifically by KRS section 134.420.
Tax liens of cities of the third through the sixth classes45 are
-' See II U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (1984). The lien would be enforceable under II
U.S.C. § 544(b) (1984).
KRS § 134.420(l) (1982).
I2 ld.
KRS § 134.420(2) (1982).
I ld.
' Cities in Kentucky are classified into six categories by the state legislature
according to their population. The classes are listed in KRS § 81.010 (Supp. 1984).
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protected in the same manner. If found applicable under the
particular circumstances, the lien on the specific property as-
sessed is superior to prior recorded mortgages and security in-
terests.4 A lien established on all other property not specifically
covered by the statute, however, remains subject to the rights
of mortgagees under prior recorded mortgages or security inter-
ests .47
Finally, according to the court in Commonwealth v. J.V.
Jellico Coal Co.,48 if the state seeks to apply the lien to a coal
lessee's rights under a lease, the lien can apply to the lessee's
interest only, and does not apply to the real property if the lease
has been terminated in accordance with its terms. 49 In that case,
the property in question belonged to the lessee and had been
assessed by the taxing authority. When the bankrupt lessee failed
to make payment, the Commonwealth sought to enforce a lien
against the lessor of the real property. The court held that the
lessor's cancellation of the coal lease, pursuant to the terms of
a lease which terminated the lessee's interest upon bankruptcy,
acted to terminate the taxing authority's lien on the land itself-
particularly since the legislature had singled out coal, oil, and
gas leases for special statutory treatment.50
I. Unemployment Compensation Liens
Liens created by statute in favor of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky Cabinet of Human Resources to secure amounts of
contribution, interest and penalty payable by employers for un-
employment compensation are of particular interest to mining
companies.' The liens have the same priority as state, county,
and municipal ad valorem tax liens, and are superior to the lien
of any mortgage or encumbrance created "upon all property of
any subject employer .. ."I' The lien commences from the time
I See Midland-Guardian Co. v. McElroy, 563 S.W.2d 752 (Ky. App. 1978) (hold-
ing that taxes assessed against particular property had priority over a recorded mortgage);
see also Ky. OAG 83-477 (December 9, 1983).
" See Ky. OAG 83-477.
- 12 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1928).
I d. at 699.
I Id.
See KRS §§ 341.310-.315 (1983).
KRS § 341.310(l) (1983).
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the contributions, interest, and penalties become due, with notice
of the lien to be filed with the county clerk in any county where
the subject employer has property registered in books designated
by the statute as "Miscellaneous State Tax Liens."" However,
the treatment of such liens in cases of insolvency or reorgani-
zation under the Bankruptcy Code is subject to question since
they are entitled only to priority status rather than secured
creditor status.5 4 If the liens are enforceable as claims against
property ahead of secured creditors in Bankruptcy Court, the
liens would also be enforceable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section
544(b).
55
J. Workers' Compensation Lien
All awards against an employer for workers' compensation
benefits (to the extent not paid from applicable insurance funds)
can constitute a lien "against the assets of the employer to the
same extent as is allowed by law for any unpaid wages for
labor. ' 56 Kentucky courts have held that the lien to secure
unemployment compensation contributions under KRS section
341.310 has priority not only over the lien to secure workers' com-
pensation awards under KRS section 341.175, but also over the
lien securing laborers' wages under KRS sections 376.150 and
376.160."
The application of this lien to the mineral industry was
discussed at length in Adkins v. Carol Mining Company.58 The
court held that
as a general rule, a statutory lien does not take precedence
over a prior contractual lien, it is ... within the power of the
Legislature to give a statutory lien priority over other liens,
and, having such power, where the statute clearly shows and
" KRS § 341.310(2) (1983).
See II U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(D) (1984).
" See I1 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1984).
KRS § 342.175 (1983).
In Commonwealth ex rel. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Durham, 161
S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1942), the court stated: "[T]he sovereign State of Kentucky did not
choose to place the laborors' claim for wages ahead of its claim for taxes and the
Legislature in enacting the Act provided that the Commission's claim for unemployment
compensation contributions against the employer would be superior to all other liens."
' 136 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1940).
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declares an intention to cause the statutory lien to override or
take precedence over a prior contractual lien, it must be con-
strued as effecting such priority of lien over it.19
The court thereby granted superiority to the workers' compen-
sation liens and laborer's wage liens over contractual liens for
rents and royalties. 6°
K. Landlords' Liens
Kentucky provides a statutory lien for the benefit of
landlords6' which, as applied to the mineral industry, is the
product of two separate statutes. KRS section 383.070(1) provides
that "[a] landlord renting premises for farming or coal mining
purposes shall have a lien on the produce of the premises rented
and the fixtures, household furniture, and other personal proper-
ty owned by the tenant or undertenant ... 6 dating from the
time possession is taken under a lease. Furthermore, the statute
secures one year's rent "due and to become due."
'6
KRS section 383.070(2), on the other hand, provides that "every
other landlord" (thus including oil and gas lessors) shall have a
lien only "on the fixtures, household furniture, and other per-
sonal property of the tenant or undertenant" dating from the
time possession was taken. The lien secures the payment of four
(4) months' rent, as long as the rent is not past due for more
than four (4) months or 120 days.6 By its express terms, the
lien provides coal lessors with substantially greater rights than
oil and gas lessors, including a specific lien on "the produce of
the premises rented." ' 65 No similar words are found in the section
applicable to oil and gas leases, appearing to indicate that the
produce of the gas or oil well would not be covered by the lien.
However, there are no reported Kentucky decisons on this point.
L. Federal Tax Lien
Liens in favor of the United States are governed by the
' Id. at 38.
" Id. at 39.
KRS § 383.070 (1972).
.2 KRS § 383.070(1) (1972).
" Id.
KRS § 383.070(2) (1972).
1 I ld. at (I).
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Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. 66 The lien is enforceable against
third parties from the date a Notice of Lien is filed in the local
county clerk's office to validate the lien. From that date, the
lien applies to all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to the person who has neglected or re-
fused to pay a federal tax for which he or she is liable.67
Although the Federal Tax Lien Act should be subject to uniform
interpretation nationwide, its application is dependent upon state
law to determine whether rights of the taxpayer constitute "prop-
erty or rights in property" within the language of the federal
statutes. 68
A recent Oklahoma decision involving the application of a
federal tax lien to oil and gas runs will undoubtedly have impact
in Kentucky unless significant differences in Kentucky law are
found. In Bigheart Pipeline Corp. v. United States,69 federal
employment taxes were assessed against an operator. The oper-
ator assigned a seventy-eight percent interest in the working
rights of an undeveloped oil and gas lease prior to the time that
the federal government filed notice of the tax lien, but the
assignment was not recorded until after the tax lien notices were
filed in the approporiate office.70 A customer purchased oil from
the assignee. Upon receipt of the notice of levy, the customer
withheld payment to the assignee and instituted an interpleader
action in district court. 7' In determining the rights of the gov-
ernment to the proceeds of the oil runs, the federal district court
stated that an oil lessee has a property interest, in the nature of
a profit a prendre under Oklahoma law,72 which does not vest
any right in the oil in place but merely creates a right to prospect
for and take out oil if and when found.73 Since, at the time the
- 26 U.S.C. § 6321-6326 (1982).
6 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982).
See United States v. Bank of Celina, 721 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1983).




" Id. (citing Kolachny v. Galbreath, 110 P. 902 (Okla. 1910) and Frank Oil Co.
v. Belleview Gas & Oil, 119 P. 260 (Okla. 1911)).
" Bigheart, 600 F. Supp. at 53. The court stated:
The Court believes under § 6321 and applicable case law, a federal tax lien
clearly may attach to a contingent interest. The statute itself provides a
lien in favor of the United States can attach upon all property or "rights
in property." In Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.
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taxpayer's interest was assigned, the lessee taxpayer's interest
was contingent, the court held that the federal tax lien attached
to the contingent interest just as it might have attached to a
contract right.74 The court also held the federal tax lien attached
to the oil as it was extracted by the assignee and to the proceeds
upon the sale of the oil by the operator.71
M. Execution Liens
Under Kentucky law, the rendition of a judgment in per-
sonam for a sum of money does not, by itself, create a lien
upon any property for the satisfaction of the judgment. Instead,
an execution against personal property must be obtained upon
application to the court. 76 The ordinary writ of execution, com-
parable to the common law writ of fieri facias,77 becomes a lien
only from the time it is placed in the hands of a proper officer
for execution.78 Enforceability of the execution lien, however,
can frequently become a very complex matter open to interpre-
tation by the courts.
In Adams v. Napier,7 9 the court held that where the officer
had failed to adequately appraise the value of the property, there
could be no levy of execution and sale of land.80 More recently,
the court in W. E. Stephens Manufacturing Co. v. Miller,8 set
aside an execution lien because of the sheriff's failure to properly
execute the lien, explaining that the property on which a levy is
made must be adequately described with such particularity and
distinctness so as to reasonably identify the property.82
1976), the court held a taxpayer's contract right was a property interest to
which a federal lien could attach.
1 Id. at 53-54.
7- KRS § 426.010 (1972).
71 Fierifacias is translated as "cause it to be done." In practice, it refers to a writ
ordering the sheriff to levy and make the amount of a judgment from the goods and
chattels of the debtor. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 754 (5th ed. 1979).
7 KRS § 426.120(1) (1972).
334 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1960).
Id. at 917.
429 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1968).
'2 Id. at 387. The court held that an endorsement stating "Executed the within
execution upon all of H.C. Miller, d/b/a Miller's of Bardstown fixtures and equipment
and his motor vehicle" was invalid, as was a subsequent endorsement which stated
"Executed the within Execution by levying upon all of H.C. Miller's of Bardstown
fixtures and equipment and his motor vehicle." The court, however, held valid an
[VOL. 2:131
MECHANICS' LIEN AND OTHER LIEN ASSERTIONS
A complex question of statutory application arises when the
execution lien claimant attempts to levy upon a lessee's working
interest in a mine-particularly when the underlying claim arises
out of a totally unrelated matter. For instance, if the claimant
is the supplier of goods or services to an operation on a partic-
ular parcel of land, can it successfully place a levy against the
lessee's operating interest in another mine in an attempt to satisfy
its mechanic's lien judgment?
Unfortunately, Kentucky case law which details the proper
attachment procedures in such situations is inadequate. The courts
also have failed to provide any guidelines as to whether the
lessee's working interest should be treated as personalty or realty
for attachment purposes.
When faced with the dilemma of needing to attach a mineral
lessee's working interest in a mine or well, the claimant should
therefore attempt to comply with the personal property attach-
ment requirements by: (i) placing the lien in the hands of the
proper officer;83 (ii) giving the officer detailed attachment in-
structions (including advising him to actually survey the property
and properly appraise it);8 (iii) requesting him to endorse the
writ by describing the property with particularity;85 and (iv)
specifying that the defendant debtor be properly notified of the
levy. 6 Even after taking such pains to assure enforceability,
however, the claimant may still find that his execution lien will
fail if the lessee's working interest is classified as an interest in
real property rather than in personalty. Therefore, the cautious
claimant must also comply with the real property attachment
requirement by filing a lis pendens notice on the leasehold in-
terest.'
The order of disposition of property under an execution lien
also is controlled by statute. Personal property must be levied
endorsement which stated "Executed the within execution by levying same on all of the
stock of merchandise, fixtures and appliances located in the store building now operated
by H.C. Miller under the name of Miller's of Bardstown and located at 106 North Third
Street, Bardstown, Kentucky, on this the 6th day of July, 1965." Id. at 386.
See KRS § 426.120(I) (1972).
See C.T.C. Investment Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corp., 58 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.
1931); Adams, 334 S.W.2d at 917.
See Stephens Manufacturing, 429 S.W.2d at 387.
See C.T.C. Investment, 58 F.2d at 316-17.
, See KRS § 382.450 (1970).
19861
JOURNAL OF INERAL LAW AND POLICY [VOL. 2:131
upon and sold under execution prior to the sale of any land."8
If there is insufficient personalty to satisfy the entire judgment,
the local sheriff may levy upon the judgment debtor's realty
without the issuance of any further execution.8 9 Choses in action,
however, have been held not subject to levy under execution. 9°
The validity of the execution lien as against subsequent pur-
chasers or lessees of the property dates only from the time a lis
pendens notice is filed in the county clerk's office for the county
in which the property is located. 91 Although the personal estate
of the judgment debtor may be sold at or near the place of the
levy, 92 prior newspaper advertisement is required for sale of any
kind of properties with an appraised value of $100 or more. 93
N. Mine Reclamation Liens
Amounts spent "to restore, reclaim, abate, control, or pre-
vent adverse effects of past coal mining practices on privately
owned land" can be recovered by the federal government9 or
by the state95 under a Mine Reclamation Lien. Although the
liens attach upon the land as of the date of expenditures of the
monies, the Secretary of Interior or corresponding state official
is required to file a statement in the appropriate clerk's office.
The amount of the lien cannot be in excess of the amount
determined by appraisal to be the increase in the market value
of the land as a result of the restoration of the premises.9 s
0. Improvements
Any person believing himself to be the owner of the property
by reason of a claim in iaw or equity, but who is later dispos-
sessed of the property by judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction, is granted a statutory right to the "value of the
- See KRS § 426.130 (1972).
x9 See KRS § 426.140 (1972); see also Ky. OAG 84-173.
See Doyle v. Sleeper, 31 Ky. (I Dana) 531 (1833).
See KRS §§ 382.440-.470 (1972 and Supp. 1984).
See KRS § 426.160 (1972).
See KRS § 426.560 (1972).
See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Pub. L.
No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 465 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1238).
KRS § 350.575 (1983).
Id. at (1); see also SMCRA § 408(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1238(a) (1982).
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improvements" created by him while an occupant of the land. 97
Under statutory proceedings, the dispossessed occupant is given
a judgment for monetary damages in the amount of the im-
provements and is then entitled to a lien upon the land recovered
from him to satisfy the judgment. 98 The displaced occupant is
also entitled to the benefit of any crops growing on the land at
the time of the judgment of eviction.9
This lien is only available, however, if the occupant believes
in good faith that he is the owner of the land. In Raydure v.
Lindley, '0 the court refused to grant an improvement lien to a
party who had forcibly taken possession of the land for the
purpose of drilling for oil. ' ° ' The court determined that such
persons were not entitled to protection because they could not
meet the "good faith" standard.1
0 2
P. Trust Fund for Benefit of Materialmen
Although KRS section 376.070(1) technically does not create
a lien, it may create a broad right in favor of suppliers. The statute
provides a specific right in the proceeds of the project to which
supplies were furnished.' °0 Although this statute has apparently
never been applied in the mineral field, it is conceivable that such
an application might occur if the word "owner" were construed
to include both the fee owner and the owner of a working interest
in a well or mine-i.e., a mineral lessee. Under such a construc-
tion, subcontractors and suppliers would have a lien upon the pro-
ceeds of the mineral output in the form of payments received by
either the fee owner, the operator/miner, or a general contractor.
One court has interpreted the statute to create a property interest
See KRS § 381.460-.570 (1972 and Supp. 1984).
See KRS § 381.550 (1972).
See KRS § 381.570 (1972).
268 F. 338 (6th Cir. 1920).
' d. at 342.
2 Id. at 343.
'' KRS § 376.070(l) (1972), provides:
Any contractor, architect or other person who builds, repairs or improves
the property of another under such circumstances that a mechanics' or
materialman's lien may be imposed on the property shall, from the proceeds
of any payment received from the owner, pay in full all persons who have
furnished material or performed labor on the property.
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in favor of suppliers in funds held under trust for them by a general
contractor.'""
Q. Illegal Mining Operations
Under KRS section 351.177(3), the Department of Mines and
Minerals is "empowered with the authority to seize and take posses-
sion of any equipment being used for the purpose of illegal mining
of coal without a valid mine license as required by K.R.S. Sec-
tion 351.175." Furthermore, seizure of equipment used in such
illegal operations can occur without issuance of a warrant.'10
Although not technically a statutory lien, this section has the same
impact of tying up ownership of equipment seized from "wildcat"
operators.
Upon conviction of persons for violation of KRS section
351.175, the statute further provides for the sale of all equipment so
seized through a sealed bidding process, with proceeds from the
sale being deposited in an "illegal mining fund'"' 6 to be used to
enforce Chapters 351 and 352.107 The forfeiture and sale of seized
property, however, is subject to a valid lienholder's claim. 08 In
order to prevail, the lienholder must establish at a special hearing
"that the property was being used in connection with mining
without a license without the knowledge, consent or approval of
the owner or lienor. '"' °9
II. APPLICATION OF STATUTORY LIENS TO OIL AND COAL
REDUCED TO POSSESSION AND TO THE PROCEEDS
OF OIL RUNS AND COAL MINED
With the exception of common law possessory liens, equi-
table liens, and contractual liens, all the liens described in Part
I are statutory. The application of these liens to minerals ex-
tracted after lien attachment to the real property is of critical
11 See In re D. & B. Electric, Inc., 4 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980) (the
court reached this conclusion by relying on Henry A. Petter Supply Co. v. Hal Perry
Constr. Co., 563 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)).
S05 See Ky. OAG 82-417.
'" KRS § 351.177(4) (1984).
'7 Id. at (I1).
-o Id. at (5).
- Id.
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importance to all parties affected. Lien claimants may seek to
have their liens apply to the extracted oil or gas or coal, or they
may attempt to apply the liens to the proceeds of such extrac-
tion. ' 0
A case law survey of the various statutory liens applicable
to mineral interests in Kentucky leads to the conclusion that
Kentucky courts have not yet addressed the question of which
lien interests, if any, attach to oil and gas runs, coal produced
from working mines, or the proceeds of either type of mineral
sold. The wording of the landlord's lien statute against a coal
mine,I" and the wording of KRS section 376.070(1), which pro-
vides the basis for the trust fund theory," 2 appear to provide the
only clear instances of Kentucky authority attaching a lien to the
produce of a mineral working interest." 3 The remaining state
statutes are silent with respect to "produce" or "proceeds" of
the property subject to the lien. Such silence could be construed
to mean that the liens do not attach to oil runs, produced coal
or gas, or to the proceeds of such operations. "4
Other courts, however, have refused to apply strict statutory
construction where the property owner has sold the property in
an attempt to remove it from the reach of the creditor. " 5 Instead,
they have allowed the creditor to "follow the proceeds of the
property in the hands of the [owner] and subject the proceeds
to his debt." '"1 6 Such treatment is generally available, however,
only when the secured goods have been wrongfully converted or
sold to a bona fide purchaser. If these preliminary conditions
". U.C.C. § 9-306(l) (1960) defines proceeds as "whatever is received upon the
sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."
- KRS § 383.070(l) (1972) provides that the landlord has a lien "on the produce
of the premises rented and the fixtures, household furniture, and other personal property
owned by the tenant, or undertenant .. " Within the second section of the same
statute, the rights of other mineral landlords are much narrower-being solely applicable
to "fixtures, household furniture, and other personal property." Id. at 2. By not using
the same term "produce of the premises," the statute appears to exclude the right of
the landlord to produced oil and gas or any proceeds derived therefrom.
,,2 For the text of KRS § 376.070(l) (1972), see supra note 103.
.. See supra notes 103-1Il and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Moore v. Boxman, 245 N.E.2d 866 (Ind. 1969); Crawford v. Baker,
32 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1930); McGregor Co. v. Heritage, 631 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Ore. 1981).
'" Crawford, 32 S.W.2d at 343.
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are not met, the lien's application will not extend to proceeds
unless there are specific statutory provisions to that effect.
This distinction is illustrated in McGregor v. Heritage,''7 an
Oregon case. The lien was an agricultural services lien provided
by Oregon statute. " ' In refusing to extend the lien to cover the
proceeds of a potato crop, the Oregon Supreme Court explained:
It has been held that some common law or equitable liens
extend to the proceeds of the sale of the security. Mortgages,
trust deeds and security agreements may also result in rights
sometimes referred to as "liens," and it has been held that the
"liens" under such agreements may also extend to the proceeds
of the sale of the security.
We also find cases in which courts have held that common
law and equitable liens, as well as "liens" under mortgages
and other types of security agreements, may extend to the
proceeds of the sale of the security when the security has been
wrongfully converted or sold to a bona fide purchaser so as
to destroy the lien upon the security or make it impossible to
enforce the lien against the security....
We find no authority, however (and none has been cited to
us), to support a rule to the effect that when, ... the goods
subject to a lien created by statute which provides for a lien
against the goods are not wrongfully converted or sold to a
bona fide purchaser, but are sold or delivered to a third party
who has notice of the lien, the lien holder can nevertheless
enforce such a statutory lien against the proceeds of the goods,
rather than foreclose it against the goods themselves, in the
absence of statutory provisions to that effect." 9
The court concluded that since the defendant had failed "to
plead and prove that wrongful conversion or sale took place
without [its] knowledge and before [it] was able to enforce [its]
lien against the security,"' 20 and since there were no statutory
provisions specifying the extension of coverage to these proceeds,
the defendant was not entitled to recover from the proceeds of
the crop. '
2
631 P.2d 1355 (Ore. 1981).
OR. REV. STAT. § 87.266 (1985).
McGregor, 631 P.2d at 1360.
' Id. at 1361.
Id.
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It is crucial to all parties that the applicability of the various
liens to proceeds and produced minerals be clearly established.
Mineral operators require regular cash flow from the extraction
of the minerals in order to continue operation. Purchasers of
the oil and gas or coal expect to pay for the ownership of the
mineral, free and clear of lien rights in third parties. Obviously,
paying the agreed amount twice in order to obtain clear own-
ership of the extracted minerals is undesirable.
Kentucky has had no decisions from its highest court delin-
eating the relative rights of lienholders, working interest holders,
and/or purchasers in situations where liens are asserted against
leasehold interests. Although the following cases show one or
more applications of lien actions in the mineral industry, they
fail to address whether one or more of the liens attached to
produced oil or gas, or to mined coal, or to the proceeds of
either.
A. Central Contractor's Service v. Ohio County Stone Co.
In Central Contractor's Service v. Ohio County Stone Co.,' 22
several statutory lien claims were consolidated in a single action
against Central Contractors Service.'23 The liens were created
against a predecessor, Indianhead Mining Corporation, which
had acquired a strip of land in Ohio County for surface mining
purposes. Indianhead erected a steel tipple, a tower house, a
machine shop, and other buildings on the property, and had
purchased equipment and materials for use in the mining oper-
ation. 2 4 When the mining company subsequently ceased opera-
tions and filed for bankruptcy, its property was sold to Central
Contractors Service "subject to any and all liens and claims
whatsoever."
25
Central Contractors did not deny that the bankrupt company
was indebted to the lien claimants nor did it deny that the
equipment and materials had been used on the property. It did,
however, attack the validity of the liens on several grounds. It
first questioned the technical sufficiency of the liens under the
-22 255 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1952).
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general mechanics' lien statute 26 because the property identified
in the lien statement filed with the clerk's office was not de-
scribed adequately. The court dismissed this challenge, finding
that the property was described with enough specificity to allow
adequate identification.127
Central Contractors also resisted the liens on the basis that
the petition to foreclose the lien did not describe the property
charged, other than being a claim against "all the property and
assets" or all of the "real estate described herein and the per-
sonal property and assets, tipple, building.... ",128 The court
found that this was an adequate description for the purpose of
the foreclosure action, 29 and that the lien, 30 created specifically
to apply against the lessee's lease interest and equipment in
situations like the one before the court, applied to all machinery
and equipment. Thus, personalty was subject to the mechanic's
lien under that section. The court further held that oral agree-
ments for the supply of goods were sufficient contracts for
purposes of the lien.' 3'
Central Contractors then challenged the nature of the judg-
ment as being a judgment in personam against it. The court
explained that the judgment was not in its nature "personal,"
but was one solely for the purpose of "subjecting Central's
property to a lien for the specific amounts set forth."'13 2 Thus,
the court determined that the claims of most of the lien claimants
were valid as against the personal property improvements ac-
quired by Central Contractors from the bankrupt mining com-
pany. Although two of the lien claimants had not correctly
followed the steps prescribed by statute'33 the court found that
KRS § 376.010 (1952) provided thai the statement of lien must comply with the
predecessor to KRS § 376.080 (1978), containing "a description of the property intended
to be covered by the lien sufficiently accurate to identify (it]."
"I Central Contractors, 255 S.W.2d at 19.
118 The court stated: "It is clear that each of these petitions identifies the property
to be charged as all that used or occupied by the Mining Co. at the site of its mining
operation." Id.
I2 d.
See KRS § 376.140 (1972).
See Central Contractors, 255 S.W.2d at 20.
'32 Id.
KRS § 376.120 (1972), requires that "[a]ny person holding a lien against the
property, whether arising under the provisions of KRS § 376.010 or otherwise, is required
to present his claim with the evidence in its support to the commissioner."
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one of them had complied sufficiently with the requirements of
KRS section 376.120 by providing the required information to the
Special Commissioner."'
The other lien claimant, Williams Tractor Company, had
supplied repairs and spare parts but had failed to file the re-
quired statement of lien; as a result, its claim was denied.'
Although Williams Tractor argued that the failure to file the
required statement should be excused because of the bankruptcy
proceedings against the debtor, this excuse was disallowed by
the court.' j Williams Tractor then asserted a common law lien
which was dismissed by the court because the claimant did not
have any of the debtor's property in its possession.' 37 The court
also denied the claimant's equitable lien argument, stating that
since Williams Tractor could not show some superior right to
any property, it could not obtain the benefit of an equitable lien
after failing to comply with statutory requirements.'38
While the decision in Central Contractors may be helpful to
those wishing to assert liens against tangible personal property
of mineral operators, it provides no guidance as to the entitle-
ment of lien claimants to oil runs, to produced coal, or to the
proceeds of either.
B. Adkins v. Carol Mining Co.
Adkins v. Carol Mining Co.3 9 involved a dispute between
mineral lessors to a bankrupt mining company and the employees
of the defunct company over compensation and wage claims
against the assets of the mining company. 40 The lessor royalty
holders instituted a petition alleging the mining company's in-
solvency and breach of the terms of the mineral leases, and
11 Central Contractors, 255 S.W.2d at 21. (Lien claimant W. H. Greer was found
to have followed the proper procedures authorized by KRS § 376.120 and was therefore
granted his lien claim.).
" Id. (Williams Tractor Company had failed to comply with the procedures set
forth in KRS § 376.010(2), requiring the claimant to "file in the office of the county
clerk of the county wherein he has furnished or expects to furnish labor or materials,




" 136 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1940).
Id. at 34.
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sought an injunction restraining the mining company and its
agent "from mining and removing coal from the premises or
trespassing thereon. "141 The labor claimants, having been joined
in the action, set up their statutory liens for compensation and
unpaid wages, and asserted that their liens were entitled to
statutory priority over the claims of the royalty holders.'
42
Finding that KRS section 376.150 gave priority to the unpaid
wages, the court granted priority status to the employees for
both unpaid wages and unpaid compensation benefits up to the
amounts of those benefits and wages. 143 Since the mining oper-
ations had been terminated by the injunction, the question of
application of the liens to mined coal or the proceeds following
the sale was never addressed by the court.
C. Weir v. Jarecki Manufacturing Co.
Although Weir v. Jarecki Manufacturing Co.'" has often
been criticized on a point not immediately relevant here, 45 the
case might provide some guidance on whether mechanic's lien
claimants can attach to "oil runs." In Weir, the holders of an
entire working interest in an oil and gas lease assigned an un-
divided one-half interest in the lease to an individual named
Curtis who, in consideration for the assignment, agreed to drill,
"' Id. at 33.
Id. at 33-34 (the claims of priority were based on KRS §§ 376.150 and 342.175).
Id. at 38-39.
72 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1934).
," The court in Weir attempted to draw a distinction based on the fact that the
contract underlying the dispute had been recorded. Id. at 452. This distinction was later
criticized in Campbell & Summerhays, Inc. v. Greene, 381 S.W.2d 531, 533, (Ky. 1964),
where the court explained:
In Weir v. Jarecki Mfg. Co., 254 Ky. 738, 72 S.W.2d 450, where a contract
for the sale of an undivided interest in an oil and gas lease required the
vendee to drill certain wells, it was held that the persons who furnished
labor and materials for the drilling of the wells could not enforce a lien
against the interest of the vendor. Some importance was attached to the
fact that the recorded contract of sale contained a provision that the wells
should be drilled without cost or expense to the vendors. The opinion in
the Weir case undertook to distinguish Penney v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,
238 Ky. 167, 37 S.W.2d 5, where a contract for the sale of a hotel property
required the vendee to make substantial improvements, and it was held
that liens could be enforced against the vendor's interest.
We can see no real distinction between the Weir and Penney cases and it is our opinion
now that the Weir decision is unsound, particularly as concerns the significance of recording.
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equip and fully complete six wells on the leased property and to
run oil from the wells into storage tanks free of any expense to
the holders.'46 The agreement also provided that Curtis' rights
would be forfeited if he failed to complete all six wells. 
47
Curtis began the development of drilling operations and
completed the first well before assigning the lease agreement to
a corporation of which he was an organizer. The successor
corporation then borrowed a sum of money from a local bank
and granted its interest in the lease as collateral security for the
loan, also authorizing the bank to collect the oil runs and apply
the same to repay the note.' 48 The development company failed
before completion of the final well, whereupon the royalty hold-
ers sued for forfeiture of the assignment.'
49
The trial court entered a judgment declaring that the forfei-
ture was effective for failure to comply with the terms of the
assignment. 50 Following these actions, mechanic's lien claims
were filed, and the commissioner of the lower court held that
the claimants had a lien on the entire leasehold in the sum of
their respective claims.' 5 ' On review, Kentucky's highest court
found that the mechanic's lien claimants were entitled to a lien
against the leasehold' 52 under the predecessor to KRS section
376.140."1 The court, addressing the question of what property
was subject to the mechanic's lien claims, stated: "It is a settled
rule that a mechanic's lien attaches only to the interest in the prop-
erty of the person who creates the lien, and that his interest only
can be sold to satisfy same, unless the owner consents in writing
that such liens can be created.
'"' 54
The court focused upon the interests of Curtis, the original
assignee, and the development corporation and found that the
leasehold held by the development corporation was in the nature
of the interest held by a purchaser of land which was subject to
Weir, 72 S.W.2d at 450.





Weir, 72 S.W.2d at 452-53 (the court held that the leasehold was the one-half
interest assigned by appellants to Curtis and his assignee corporation).
Ky. St. Supp. 1924, § 2479a-l to 2479a-7.
Id. at 452.
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being divested.' 5 Therefore, the court ruled that the mechanic's
lien claims did not attach to the real property interest held by
the original assignors of the working interest but only to the
property held by the development company and the improve-
ments brought to the property during the term of its posses-
sion. 56
The court then determined that the mechanic's lien claimants
were entitled to enforce their liens against the one-half interest
in the lease assigned to the development corporation, and that
the bank, which had loaned money to the development corpo-
ration in exchange for a pledge of the same leasehold interest,
was entitled to a contractual lien on one-half of the oil runs (the
other half belonging to the original royalty holders).
15 7
Weir would thus appear to stand for the proposition that
the lien claims of materialmen and suppliers against the property
of oil and gas lessees under KRS section 376.140 do not attach
to oil runs or proceeds of oil runs. Thus, such rights to the oil itself
and the proceeds therefrom appear to be free of the lien claim-
ants' rights. The difficulty in reaching this conclusion, however,
is the possibility-whether logical or not-that the security in-
terest granted to the bank was perfected prior to the time that
the first labor and materials were supplied by the lien claimants
and thus the mechanic's lien claims attached to the leasehold
subject to the prior-created contactual lien. This result would
not be consistent with the statement in the case that Curtis had
developed a well before the assignment to the grantor of the
contractual lien to the bank, but no further clarification can be
obtained from the face of the ruling itself.
D. Continental Supply Co. v. Sandy River Oil Co. 's Receiver
Continental Supply Co. v. Sandy River Oil Co. 's Receiver"'
is significant primarily for its history of the specific statutory
lien provided for mineral development, the predecessor to KRS sec-
tion 376.140.1'9 The court found that mechanic's lien claims were
' Id. at 453.
'I Id. at 454.
I d.
291 S.W. 49 (Ky. 1927).
Ky. St. Supp. 1924, § 2479a-1 to 2479a-7. This was the same provision under
review in Weir. See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
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effective against a leasehold for supplies furnished in the devel-
opment of the leasehold and subjected the lessee's assets to the
lien claims. 160 In response to a challenge made to the priority of
the mechanic's lien claimants over subsequent attaching credi-
tors, the court held that the attachment lien creditor's claims
were inferior to the claims of the mechanic's lien holders.1
61
Once again, however, the court did not address entitlement to
oil runs, or to proceeds of oil runs, or to proceeds of other
minerals extracted from the property.
III. PRINCIPLES DERIVED FROM DECISIONS IN OTHER STATES
Absent a definitive decision of its own, a Kentucky court
might look to opinions from other states for guidance. However,
commentators, who discuss the entitlement of mechanic's lien
claimants to proceeds of oil and gas runs, 162 caution that general
rules cannot and should not be drawn in most lien situations
because the liens are statutory in nature and courts have gener-
ally interpreted the applicability of statutory liens quite strictly.
63
This is primarily due to the fact that lien statutes, and specifically
mechanic's lien statutes, are in derogation of common law.1
64
Therefore, although each mineral lien statute must be ana-
lyzed in detail to determine its scope, mechanic's lien statutes
which provide a lien against property of the working interest
owner of the leasehold estate generally do not apply to oil and
gas produced or the proceeds thereof unless the statute expressly
enumerates oil, gas, minerals or proceeds as being subject to the
lien. 161
This result does not appear to be dependent upon ownership
or non-ownership theories,' 66 since mechanic's liens have been
Continental Supply, 291 S.W. at 51-53.
' Id. at 53.
.6' See, e.g., Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 278 (1974); Kite & Cook, Enforcing and
Defending Against Liens on Mineral Interests: Reliance v. Reality, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 111 (1984).
'' See Kite & Cook, supra note 162, at 116. However, the authors continue by
stating: "(Olnce it is determined that the particular party is entitled to claim a lien,
the remedies provided by the ien statutes are liberally construed to provide substantial
justice." Id.
See Southport Petroleum Co. v. Fithian, 13 So.2d 382, 383 (La. 1943).
'' See Annot., supra note 162, at 282.
Under the ownership theory, minerals are considered part of the realty, while
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held not to attach to oil runs and proceeds in Louisiana, 61
Oklahoma, 16 or Kansas169-all states that apply the non-owner-
ship theory to oil and gas prior to production-or in Arkansas'
70
or Colorado"7 -two states which consider unproduced oil and
gas to be part of the real property subject to a leasehold interest.
A review of the cases indicates that a mechanic's lien claim has
been clearly and unequivocably granted against such an interest
only when a state's mechanic's lien statute expressly grants a
lien against produced oil or gas and the proceeds therefrom.1
2
One major complication arises when applying these decisions
to Kentucky mineral lien disputes. The basic assumption behind
the decisions from other states that statutes in derogation of the
under the non-ownership theory, the lessee has only a right to search for and reduce the
mineral to possession, and there is no title in the minerals as long as they remain in the
earth. See Annot., supra note 162, at 287.
'7 See Southport 13 So.2d 382. Plaintiff who had purchased crude oil from lessee
asked the court to determine to whom it owed the purchase price of oil because of
several lien claims to the proceeds. The court held that the lien was only valid against
oil produced and stored on the leasehold, and was not valid on oil produced from wells
and funds derived from the sale of such oil. In so ruling, the court pointed out that,
since in Louisiana there is no title to oil as long as it remains in the earth, even the oil
flowing through the pipelines of a well cannot be considered part of the well and cannot
therefore be subject to a lien. Id. at 383-84.
'- See Stanolind Crude Oil Purchasing Co. v. Busey, 90 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1939)
(where the court concluded that a lien attached only to property specifically mentioned
in the statute and did not therefore apply to all oil as and when produced since the
statute did not mention proceeds).
"' See Black v. Giarth, 128 P. 183 (Kan. 1912) (where the court held that a lien
perfected according to the statute did not attach against the proceeds of oil, but rather
attached against the leasehold itself).
"0 See Tarheel Drilling & Equipment Co. v. Valley Steel Products Co., 330 S.W.2d
717 (Ark. 1960) (where the court in dictum indicated a readiness to apply a lien to
proceeds from minerals underlying the surface where a lien could be shown to cover the
land).
- See Chambers v. Nation, 497 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1972) (where proceeds resulting
from the sale of oil produced from a well after attachment of the lien were held not to
be subject to attachment where the applicable statute did not specifically mention
proceeds).
"I See Pheister v. Ogden Smelting & Refining Mills, Inc., 364 P.2d 1078 (Wyo.
1961) (where mechanic's lien claimant successfully asserted a claim against the oil
produced and the proceeds from the sale of the oil under a statute which expressly
mentioned proceeds); see also La Bellman v. Gleason & Sanders, Inc., 418 P.2d 949
(Okla. 1966) (where the court refused to apply a lien against proceeds from an oil run
because the statute in effect at that time of the attachment did not specifically mention
proceeds even though the amended statute in effect at the time of the trial did contain
such specific language).
MECHANICS' LIEN AND OTHER LIEN ASSERTIONS
common law are to be strictly construed does not apply in
Kentucky.17 This is not to say, however, that these cases would
not be persuasive in Kentucky since Kentucky's courts could
reach the same result based on a different analysis.
In Powers v. Brewer, 74 the court noted that mechanic's lien
statutes do not create personal liability against the owner of the
property for the supplies furnished but create only a right in
rem against the property. 17 Thus, unless the statute identifies a
particular type of property as being subject to a mechanic's lien,
a claimant will have no right against it. More recently, the
Kentucky Supreme Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals
have said that statutes should be narrowly construed when a
clear meaning is apparent and that the courts should not psy-
choanalyze legislative intent to reach a result that the legislature
might have, but did not, provide for in the statute.
76
The second principle used to decide whether proceeds of
operations are subject to lien claims is equally applicable in
Kentucky. Since at least two lien statutes 77 specifically use the
term "produce" or "proceeds" when describing what property
is subject to a lien, the absence of those words from the me-
chanic's lien statutes 7 1 cannot be ignored or considered inad-
vertent, particularly in view of the positions taken by other
states' courts. 7 9 It would therefore appear unlikely that a lien
claimant would be successful in asserting a claim against the
proceeds of oil or gas runs under current Kentucky statutes.
CONCLUSION
A survey of the case law addressing various statutory liens
applicable to mineral interests in Kentucky leads to the conclu-
"I See KRS § 446.080(l) (1985).
11 38 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1931).
"I Id. at 469.
"6 See Apache Coal Co. v. Fuller, 541 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ky. App. 1976) (where the
court stated: "Our function in interpreting statutes is limited to analyzing and applying
what the legislature has said, and does not extend to psychoanalyzing the legislature and
applying what it may have meant to say."); accord Smith v. Magruder, 566 S.W.2d
430, 431 (1978).
.7 See KRS §§ 383.070(l) & 376.070(l) (1972).
- See KRS § 376.010 (Supp. 1984) and § 376.140 (1972).
"7 See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3d 278, 283-299 (1974).
1986)
160 JOURNAL OF MIINERAL LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 2:131
sion that the courts have not considered which lien interests
attach to oil and gas runs, coal produced from working mines,
or the proceeds of either type of mineral sold. In the absence
of clear authority, the interests of all affected parties are in peril.
Absent a single, complex test case involving representative hold-
ers of all types of liens, judicial decisions are not likely to
provide effective guidance for many years to come-particularly
when one considers the variety of statutory liens applicable to
the mineral industry.
Clarity and certainty appear to be unobtainable-except
through a series of legislative amendments to the many lien
statutes applicable to the mineral industry. Since this industry is
so integral to the economic growth of Kentucky and since the
use of lien attachments is spreading rapidly in the industry, the
Legislature should seriously consider taking action to clarify the
types of property subject to such liens.
